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Abstract 
 
Many governments provide monetary transfers to low-income families. The mechanism 
through which these subsidies are distributed may contain several inefficiencies that 
diminish the net-value obtained by the recipients. In this paper, we build and estimate a 
behavioral dynamic model that allows us to evaluate the efficiency of current and 
alternative distribution mechanisms. The proposed model is simple and resembles the 
individual’s decision to collect the transfer. To estimate it, we use data from a cash 
transfer program in Ecuador where recipients incur high transaction costs each time they 
collect their benefits. Despite its simplicity, our model is able to replicate the observed 
data remarkably well. We use it to simulate alternative payment mechanisms and show 
that an adequate design of the delivery of payments can substantially increase the value 
of cash transfer programs. 
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Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs consist of monetary transfers to low income
families that aim to alleviate extreme poverty, while providing households with incentives
to increase their consumption of education and health services. These type of programs
have become an important part of social assistance in Latin America and have dramatically
expanded during the past decade.1
Many eﬀorts have been made to measure the eﬀects of such transfers on recipients’ well-
being. Using controlled social experiments, researchers have found that children of families
who receive transfers are healthier, more likely to attend school, and less likely to be part of
the labor force (Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd 2005, Schady and Araujo 2006, and Schulz
2004, for example).
While these previous studies provide strong evidence of the overall positive eﬀects that
CCT programs have on children’s school and health outcomes, less is known about the
beneﬁts or costs associated with the current programs’ design. For instance, there are many
dimensions in which CCT programs diﬀer (rules about eligibility, conditionality, payment
schedules, delivery of the payments, etc.), and there may exist important ineﬃciencies in
program implementation. Todd and Wolpin (2006) and Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite
(2003) use behavioral models to address this question and simulate and evaluate alternative
1The ﬁrst Latin American CCT program started in 1995 in Brazil under the government of the Distrito
Federal of Brasilia (Bolsa Escola). The second experience of a CCT program is Mexico’s Progresa (now re-
named Oportunidades) which began in 1997. Other Latin-American countries that have implemented CCT
programs in the past decade include Argentina (Familias por la Inclusion Social), Chile (Chile Solidario),
Colombia (Familias en Acción), Costa Rica (Superémonos), Ecuador (Bono de Desarrollo Humano), Hon-
duras (Programa de Asignacion Familiar), Jamaica (Programa de Avance Mediante la Salud y la Educacion),
Nicaragua (Red de Protección Social), and Uruguay (Proyecto 300). See Rawlings and Rubio (2003) and
Caldés, Coady, and Maluccio (2004) for reviews.
1programs in Mexico’s Progresa and Brasil’s Bolsa Escola, respectively. Both studies conclude
that transfers’ conditionality has an important eﬀect on school attendance, and Todd and
Wolpin suggest that alternative payment schedules may induce a greater impact on average
school attainment.2
In this research, we analyze the design of another dimension of CCT programs that, to our
knowledge, has not been considered in previous studies. We focus on the mechanism through
which governments distribute payments to the beneﬁciaries. This is an important feature
of these programs since there may be high transaction costs involved in the distribution of
these transfers, such as transportation, opportunity, and other related costs incurred by both
governments and recipients. For this reason, an adequate design of the delivery of payments
may drastically increase the value of a CCT program.
To address this issue, we specify and estimate perhaps the most basic version of a behav-
ioral dynamic model that resembles the individual’s decision to collect the transfer. Unlike
other behavioral models in the literature, ours is simple and easy to solve.3 However, despite
its simplicity, we show that it may be a powerful tool for designing the delivery of payments
of a CCT program.
We focus on one particular CCT program in Ecuador: the Bono de Desarrollo Humano
(BDH). The program consists of cash transfers to a) low-income mothers with children
younger than 16 who receive beneﬁt payments of $15 per month and b) elderly and/or
2More importantly, Todd and Wolpin provide evidence that these types of models may be able to replicate
the counterfactuals of interest reasonably well by comparing the predictions of their model with those derived
from a randomized experiment.
3In practice, behavioral models are diﬃcult to implement. In particular, as the state space increases,
computing the solution to the model involves advanced numerical methods and approximations (Berkovec
and Stern 1989, Keane and Wolpin 1994, 1997 and 2001) that, perhaps, has discouraged many applied
researchers to undertake this approach.
2disabled low-income individuals who are entitled to $11.50 per month. As of December 2004,
low-income mothers accounted for more than 80% of the total number of beneﬁciaries. The
subsidy is delivered through a payment agency network, composed of 17 ﬁnancial institutions
with approximately 250 payment centers distributed in rural and urban areas of Ecuador.
Beneﬁciaries must travel to one of these agencies and approach the counters/booths to collect
their cash. The government provides individuals with the option to cash any -accumulated-
subsidy once every one, two, three or four months.
While in most urban areas there is a relative large supply of payment agencies, in many
rural areas there is a clear shortage. For instance, in certain rural areas, beneﬁciaries need to
travel for more than two hours to the nearest payment agency. The ineﬃciency of the pro-
gram’s payment system has been criticized in several government reports which state that,
in many cases, the recipients’ transportation costs may account for more than 50% of the
transfer itself.4 Partially for this reason, a redesign of the mechanism of the payment’s deliv-
ery is under consideration.5 The behavioral model speciﬁed in this paper aims to facilitate
this task.
The model is simple and intuitive. Every period (month), beneﬁciaries have the right to
receive a lump-sum payment from the government. To receive this payment, households incur
a transportation cost that is a function of the travel time from their residence to the closest
payment agency. Households are heterogeneous in their location and in their opportunity
costs. From each individual’s perspective, future opportunity costs are random. Given these
assumptions, a household rationally chooses between collecting the transfer in the current
4Banco Central del Ecuador, Internal Staﬀ Reports, 2005.
5Banco Central del Ecuador and Ministerio de Finanzas del Ecuador, 2005.
3period or waiting to redeem the accumulated subsidy in the next period. Thus, households
that are located closer to payment agencies or that experience lower opportunity costs have
stronger incentives to redeem the transfer more often.
We estimate the model using Maximum Likelihood methods and administrative data
provided by the Ministry of Social Welfare in Ecuador. The data consists of subsidy-payment
data and demographic information from a random sample of approximately 2,500 households
(mothers) during 2004.6 The payment data allows us to identify if a beneﬁciary decided to
collect the transfer in any given month and, if so, the amount received. We also observe
several characteristics of the mother, such as her geographical location, level of education,
and marital status. In addition, we measure beneﬁciary accessibility to the payment agencies
by estimating the travel distance between the town where the beneﬁciary resides and the
closest town with a payment agency.
The structural estimates have a direct economic interpretation. For example, our results
suggest that the time-opportunity cost of beneﬁciaries is close to $0.4 per hour. This is
a reasonable estimate considering that the minimum hourly wage in Ecuador was $1 in
2004. More importantly, despite the simplicity of our model, we believe that it is able to
replicate the observed data remarkably well. For this reason, we use it to conduct several
counterfactual experiments of alternative payment mechanisms.
The ﬁrst counterfactual we consider consists of increasing the number of periods that
households are allowed to accrue their payments (from four to six months). Interestingly,
the recipient’s welfare gains from such a policy are very small. We compute another counter-
6Because behavior of disabled beneﬁciaries may be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than that of mothers, we restrict
our sample to the latter group.
4factual that allows us to quantify the household’s welfare eﬀects if the government increases
the number of payment agencies in rural locations. In particular, we assume that new pay-
ment agencies are built such that the home-to-agency travel time of a representative rural
household decreases by 60 minutes. We estimate that such policy would increase the value
of being enrrolled in the program by about 4%. Finally, the model is used to create a geo-
graphically diﬀerentiated schedule of payments that compensates rural households for their
travel time-opportunity costs.
In the following section, we present the details of the BDH program. Section 3 contains
a detailed description of the data sources, including the estimation of several reduced form
speciﬁcations. Section 4 presents the model and the estimation methods. In Section 5, we
include an economic interpretation of our estimates, an assessment of the within-sample ﬁt,
and evaluations of alternative payment programs. Finally, the last section concludes.
2T h e B D H p r o g r a m
2.1 Overview
The Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) is a conditional cash transfer program (CCT) in
Ecuador administered by the Ministry of Social Welfare. The program consists of monthly
cash transfers to low income families. The BDH has two types of beneﬁciaries: a) low-income
mothers with children younger than 16, who receive $15 per month in beneﬁts, and b) elderly
and/or disabled low-income individuals, who are entitled to $11.50 per month.
The program is the most important social assistance program in Ecuador and is by far the
government’s largest social expenditure outside of education, with total transfers equal to
nearly 8% of Central Government non-debt spending and about one percent of GDP (León,
5Vos, and Brborich, 2001).7
The BDH program started in 2003 by merging two previously existing programs, the
Bono Solidario (BS) and the Beca Escolar (BE). The BS was designed as a safety net to
compensate poor families for the elimination of gas and electricity subsidies in 1998 and
targeted mothers with earnings below US$ 40 dollars per month, people with disabilities, and
senior citizens.8 On the other hand, the Beca Escolar (BS) was a CCT program implemented
in the late 1990s. The program consisted of monthly transfers of $5 per child (up to two
children per household), which was conditional on the children’s enrollment in school and a
90% attendance rate. This program beneﬁted approximately 150,000 households.
The Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) includes all recipients of the BS and the BE,
and it aims to increase children’s health and school enrollment. For this reason, mothers
were required to a) enroll their children (ages 6 to 15) in school and allow them to attend
at least 90% of the school days, and, b) bring their children (ages six and under) to health
centers for medical check-ups twice a year. However, unlike the other CCT programs in
Latin America, the BDH has no mechanisms to verify that these conditions are being met.
Consequently, households are not taken oﬀ program rosters if mothers fail to comply with
7By comparison, in 2004, Central Government Health expenditures was only 5.9% of total non-debt
spending and a bit less than one percent of GDP; public education accounts for two-and-a-half percent of
GDP.
8The BS consisted of a modest unconditional transfer that was non-trivial by Ecuadorian standards.
At the time that the program started, mothers received 100,000 sucres per month, and senior citizens and
people with disabilities received 50,000 sucres (about 13% and 6.5% of the oﬃcial monthly minimum wage,
respectively). In April of 1999, those amounts were increased by 50%, mostly to account for high inﬂation.
During 2000, the program reached around 1.2 million beneﬁciary households, representing about 45 percent
of Ecuadorian households. Some studies suggest that, by the year 2000, the BS had a positive eﬀect on
school enrollment and children’s nutritional status. For example, an impact evaluation of the BS, conducted
by León, Vos, and Brborich (2001), who used a propensity score matching method, showed a positive impact
of around 5 percentage points on school enrollment, although no signiﬁcant impact was found on poverty
indicators. Another study, conducted by León and Younger (2004), who implemented an instrumental
variable approach, shows that the program had very minor, yet signiﬁcant and positive eﬀects on children’s
nutritional status.
6the requirements.9 Transfers to elderly and disabled individuals remained unconditional.
2.2 Selection of beneﬁciaries
The eligibility criteria for the 1998 BS was straightforward targeting low-income a) mothers,
b) old aged individuals, and c) disabled.10 At the beginning of the program, potential
recipients ﬁl l e da na p p l i c a t i o nf o r ma tal o c a lc h u r c ha n dw e r ea d m i t t e dt ot h ep r o g r a mi f
they complied with the eligibility criterion. Unfortunately, there was no external validation
of the data on the application forms, and there is evidence that many non-eligible individuals
were admitted early in the program.11
Soon after the implementation of the BS, the Ecuadorian government looked for better
instruments to verify eligibility. For instance, starting in 2000, the government made eﬀorts
to create a more comprehensive poverty proxy-mean index for individuals using targeted
surveys. This index, known as the Selben-index,12 identiﬁes potential beneﬁciaries of social
programs by classifying households according to an unmet basic needs index which is com-
puted using non-linear principal components analysis. This index is scaled from 0 to 100; 0
for the poorest and 100 for the richest.
9However, at the beginning of the program in 2003 some television programs were transmitted, at a
national level, publicizing the obligation of parents to send children to school in order to receive the transfer.
Those informational advertisements may create some level of awareness on the obligation of parents to send
their children to school and take them to the health centers in order to beneﬁt from the program (Schady
and Araujo 2006).
10The Executive Decree Number 129 of the Government of Ecuador established the following eligibility
criteria for those receiving the Bono: I) Mothers: a) Need to have at least one child younger than 18 years
of age; b) Family income should not exceed 1 million sucres; c) Mothers nor spouses should not have a
“ﬁxed” salary income. II) Old Aged: a) Older than 65 years of age; b) Family income should not exceed 1
million sucres; c) Do not have a “ﬁxed” salary income. III) Disabled: a) Between 18 and 65 years of age;
b) Disability of at least 70% (according to the Ecuadorian Social Security Institute standards). Notice that,
neither eligibility nor the cash transfer itself, depends on the family size or the number of children of the
mother.
11For example, Parandekar (1999) ﬁnds that, in 1999, about 50% of the Bono recipients did not meet the
eligibility criteria laid down by the Government.
12Selben (“Sistema de Identiﬁcación y Selección de Beneﬁciarios”) stands for Beneﬁciaries’ Identiﬁcation
and Selection System.
7In 2004, most beneﬁciaries of the BDH were selected using the Selben criterion. Only
those families that score less than 50.65, in the Selben index qualify to receive the beneﬁt
(these are families that belong to poverty quintiles 1 and 2). By then, around 90 percent
of the beneﬁciaries of the program had a corresponding Selben index score. The remaining
ten percent includes families that have not been given the Selben survey but have received
beneﬁts from the program since its initial implementation.
2.3 Payment distribution
Since the BDH began in 1998, payment of the subsidy has been in charge of a network
of banks and payment agencies in Ecuador called Banred.13 The network is composed of
17 ﬁnancial institutions with about 250 payment agencies distributed in rural and urban
areas of Ecuador where recipients may cash their beneﬁts.14 Each month, the Ministry
of Social Welfare delivers the list of persons who can cash the beneﬁtt oB a n r e d ,w h oi n
turn distributes payments through their network of payment agencies. Beneﬁciaries must
physically travel to one of these agencies and approach the counters/booths to collect their
cash. Individuals may accrue payments for up to four months.
While in most urban areas there is a relative large supply of payment agencies, in
many rural areas there is an evident shortage. To highlight this problem we present in Table
1 the geographical distribution of beneﬁciaries and payment agencies of the BDH in 2004.
A ss h o w ni nt h i sT a b l e ,al a r g es h a r eo fb e n e ﬁciaries resides in two provinces, Pichincha
and Guayas, which host the two biggest urban centers in the country. Not surprisingly,
in these two provinces, more than 75 percent of the beneﬁciaries could ﬁnd an available
13http://www.banred.ﬁn.ec/ie/serv6.htm
14Banred has a signiﬁcantly higher total number of bank agencies. However, only a “selected” group of
256 agencies served as payment points in 2004.
8payment agency in the same Parroquia,15 where they lived. Their situation contrasts with
that of individuals who reside in more rural areas. For example, in Zamora Chinchipe, a
rural province in the Amazonian jungle, only 3 percent of the recipients lived in the same
Parroquia where a payment point was available.
[Please, insert Table1]
As shown in Table 1, the coverage level of payment agencies in rural areas is low. This
raises several important questions. Is it worth it to increase the coverage level of payment
agencies in rural areas? How eﬃcient is the current payment system? Can the payment
system be improved? In this research, we aim to answer these questions by specifying and
estimating a behavioral model that depicts the individual decisions of collecting the transfer.
The estimated model will be used to simulate counterfactuals and evaluate the welfare eﬀects
of alternative payment mechanisms.
3 Data and reduced form analysis
In this section, we describe the data sources that we have gathered for our empirical analysis.
Then, we use simple reduced form models to identify the determinants of the beneﬁciaries’
collection decisions, which later, will guide the empirical speciﬁcation of the behavioral
model.
We have collected data from several sources. Our ﬁr s ts o u r c ei sa na d m i n i s t r a t i v ep a y m e n t
database managed by Banred. This database records every payment issued to the universe
of recipients (1.07 million in December 2004) from January to December 2004. We observe if
ab e n e ﬁciary decided to collect the transfer in any given month and, if so, the amount of the
15Ecuador is divided in 22 provinces and each province is composed of several smaller areas called Parro-
quias. There are about 1,200 Parroquias in Ecuador.
9subsidy received.16 In addition, the database identiﬁes whether the recipient is a mother, an
elderly or a disabled individual. Since we focus on the behavior of low-income mothers, we
select a random sample of 3,000 mothers from the payment database.
Even though Banred’s database has very detailed payment data, it oﬀers very little
information about the demographic characteristics of the beneﬁciaries. However, it includes
an individual identiﬁer that may be used to match our sample with the Selben database.
As we mentioned in the previous section, the Selben database provides information on many
household’s demographics such as the geographical location of the recipients (up to the
Parroquia level), their education level, marital status, and number of children. Furthermore,
certain characteristics of the beneﬁciaries’ housing unit, such as its size and tenure status,
are available and provide us with a measure of the household’s wealth. In 2004, about 90%
of the BHD’s recipients had a corresponding Selben index score.17 Thus, when our payment-
sample is matched with the Selben’s database, our matched database decreases to 2,523
observations.18
Finally, we compute a measure of the beneﬁciaries’ accessibility to the Banred’s payment
agencies. Ideally, we would like to know the travel time from every beneﬁciary’s residence to
the closest payment agency, referred to as the home-to-agency travel time hereafter. Since
we cannot obtain such information, we approximate it by estimating the travel distance
between the biggest town of the Parroquia where the beneﬁciary resides and the closest town
16For example, we have information whether an individual received $15 in January, $0 in February, $0 in
March, $45 in April, etc.
17The diﬀerence is composed of families that were not given the Selben survey, but have received the
program since its initial implementation.
18In addition to the observations that we could not ﬁnd in the Selben’s database, we dropped from our
sample 92 observations that reported subsidies of $11.5 per month (the subsidy received by the “elderly”
and “disabled”) rather than $15 (the transfer received by “mothers”).
10with a payment agency. This data was computed by the Ecuadorian Ministry of Welfare
using software from the Ecuadorian Geographical Military Institute. When computing this
variable, it is assumed that all vehicles travel at the legal speed limit and that no other
waiting is involved when traveling. Furthermore, if the beneﬁciary lives in a Parroquia
where a payment agency is available, the estimated travel distance is zero. Notice that there
may be several sources of measurement error in this variable. For example, in rural areas,
roads are not properly maintained, which makes it diﬃcult to travel at the speed limit. On
the other hand, there is very little speed-limit enforcement in Ecuador meaning that, despite
the roads’ conditions, some drivers may be traveling at higher speeds.
In Table 2 we present descriptive statistics of our matched database. On average, ben-
eﬁciaries collect the subsidy eleven times during 2004. However, while some individuals
recieve the subsidy every month, others do it only four times during the year. Individuals,
on average, live in a Parroquia that was located 15 minutes away from a payment agency.
However, there is signiﬁc a n tv a r i a t i o ni nt h eb e n e ﬁciaries’ travel times. For example, while
some individuals live in the same area where a designated payment agency operates (and
have zero travel costs), others spend almost two hours to travel from their residence to the
closest Parroquia with a payment point. In our sample, 62 percent of the recipients live in
an urban area (as deﬁned by the Ecuadorian 2000 Census) and 90 percent have received at
l e a s ts o m et y p eo ff o r m a le d u c a t i o n .C l o s et ot h r e eq u a r t e r so ft h em o t h e r si no u rs a m p l e
have partners (either married or living together) and, the average mother has 3.5 children.
On average, recipients live in small housing units (one room). There are, however, some
households who live in very large residences, with up to 13 rooms, and yet are still eligible to
receive the subsidy. Only 18 percent of mothers owns their home, which again illustrates the
11fact that the BDH is targeted towards low income families. Finally, we include the Selben
index for every mother in our sample. Recall that this index is between 1 and 100, and those
households who score less than 50.65 are eligible to receive the subsidy. The mean index is
40.6, about ten points below the cutoﬀ.
[Please, insert Table 2]
To identify the determinants of the beneﬁciaries’ collection decisions of the subsidy we
use a simple linear regression model. The dependent variable is the number of times that
mothers collected the $15 subsidy in 2004. The explanatory variables include household’s
demographics, regional ﬁxed eﬀects, and the distance from the recipient’s residence to the
closest payment agency. The ﬁrst column of Table 3 presents a baseline model, and the other
three columns explore alternative speciﬁcations.
Because the traveling patterns of individuals residing in urban areas signiﬁcantly diﬀer
than those of individuals living in rural areas, we allow the eﬀects of distance to vary in both
of these areas. In both urban and rural households, we expect to observe a negative rela-
tionship between the home-to-agency travel time and the number of times that the subsidy
was collected. As expected, this coeﬃcient is negative and robust across every speciﬁcation.
However, the estimated eﬀect is somewhat small. For instance, a rural household that lives
90 minutes away from a payment agency is expected to cash her payment two times less
than an identical counterpart who lives in the same town where the agency is located. In
urban areas, the eﬀect is still negative but signiﬁcantly smaller.
F r o mt h i sp o i n tf o r w a r d ,w ef o c u so nt h em o s tc o m p l e t es p e c i ﬁcation, which is presented
in the fourth column of Table 3. Demographic variables such as age, education, marital
status, and number of children have little explanatory power, although there is some evidence
12that women who have a partner have a higher expected number of subsidy redemptions in a
given year. The number of rooms and the tenure of a housing unit are indirect measures of
the household’s wealth. A negative sign in their corresponding coeﬃcients is expected since
the opportunity cost of traveling increases with wealth. As expected, both coeﬃcients are
negative and highly signiﬁcant. Finally, the inclusion of 21 regional ﬁxed eﬀects (province
dummy variables) greatly increases the explanatory power of the model. These dummy
variables are probably capturing other characteristics of the regions that are likely correlated
with the beneﬁciaries’ accessibility to the payment agencies (such as the availability of public
transportation, for example).
[Please, insert Table 3]
The previous regression analysis shows that there is an important negative association
between the home-to-agency travel time and the number of times that a mother collects the
transfer. However, due to measurement error, this coeﬃcient may be biased towards zero.
To check if measurement error is an important source of bias we estimate a probit model
with unobserved individual heterogeneity.19 The dependent variable takes the value of one if
the family received the transfer in a particular month and zero otherwise.20 The independent
variables include the same variables used in our previous linear regression model and, in some
speciﬁcations, the random unobserved component. If measurement error in the home-to-
agency travel time was an important source of bias, we would expect that the corresponding
coeﬃcient would signiﬁcantly decrease in the latter speciﬁcations. The results are shown
in Table 4. The ﬁrst and second columns show the baseline speciﬁcation, while the third
19This model is also known as probit with random eﬀects.
20Notice that we have a panel of 12 ∗ 2,523 = 30,276 observations.
13and fourth include the whole set of controls; in addition, in the second and fourth columns
we speciﬁcally control for unobserved individual heterogeneity (measurement error). The
coeﬃcient in the home-to-agency travel time variable is always negative and, as expected, it
decreases once we control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. This change is, however,
very small suggesting that measurement error is not an important source of bias. All the
other coeﬃcients have the expected signs and are robust across all speciﬁcations.
[Please, insert Table 4]
The reduced form models shown in this section are useful tools to understand why certain
families collect the subsidy more often than others. These models highlight the observed
correlations in the data and will serve as a guide for the empirical model’s speciﬁcation.
4 The model
4.1 A stylized theoretical speciﬁcation
In this section, we specify a theoretical model that resembles the collection decisions of
a representative cash transfer beneﬁciary. We start by assuming that the beneﬁciary is
an inﬁnitely-lived rational agent. Every period t she has the right to receive a lump-sum
payment of M monetary units from the government. Payments may be accumulated for up
to ¯ a periods.21 To redeem this payment, individuals need to travel for d minutes and incur
a transportation cost c(d).
Let ut(a) be the net utility that she obtains when collecting her payment
ut(a)=g[aM − c(d)] + εt, (1)
21That is, if the last transfer was recieved a periods ago, the total monetary amount that the beneﬁciary
is eligible to receive in the current period is j · M,w h e r ej =m i n {a,¯ a}.
14where g(.) is a non-decreasing function, a is the number of periods since the last transfer was
received, and εt is a random utility component. At time t, εt is revealed to the individual,
but future realizations of this component are unknown.22 In addition, let εt be identically
and independently distributed (for all t and a) according to the distribution F,w h i c hi s
common knowledge.
Let Vt(a) be the value of having an option to receive an aM payment in period t.I ft h e
beneﬁciary chooses to redeem her payment in the current period, she receives the instant
utility ut(a) and the discounted expected value of the option to receive the transfer next
period βE[Vt+1(1)]. Otherwise, she will have the option to redeem (a+1)M monetary units
in the future, and the value of this choice is βE[Vt+1(a +1 ) ] .T h u s ,Vt(a) is the highest of
these two choices
Vt(a)=m a x{ut(a)+βE[Vt+1(1)],βE[Vt+1(a +1 ) ] }; a =1 ,..,¯ a − 1. (2)
B e c a u s ep a y m e n t sm a yn o tb ea c c u m u l a t e df o rm o r et h a n¯ a periods, Equation (2) holds only
for values of a smaller than ¯ a.I fa equals to ¯ a, Equation (2) becomes
Vt(a)=m a x{ut(a)+βE[Vt+1(1)],βE[Vt+1(a)]}; a =¯ a. (3)
Let Wt(a)=E [Vt(a)]. It can be shown that, given certain standard conditions, there
exists a unique W∗(a) for all a {1,..,¯ a} that solves Equations (2) and (3) which is indepen-
dent of time.23 Thus, the solution to our theoretical model consists of an optimal strategy
P∗
t (a) where, given the current state a, the function W∗(a), and the information available
22Notice that εt may be interpreted as the household’s time-opportunity costs at time t and that, from
the family’s point of view, future realizations of these costs are random.
23Our model resembles standard search models in the labor literature (Lippman and McCall 1976 provide
a survey of such models). A well known result in similar models is that, a unique W∗(a) exists, as long as
transportation costs are not too high.
15at t, individuals choose to redeem their payment if and only if the utility from collecting the
transfer (the left hand side from the maximum operator in Equation 2) is no less than the
outside option (the right hand side from the maximum operator in Equation 2).
Notice that, given parametric assumptions, we may solve the model numerically and
simulate the recipient’s behavior.24
4.2 Empirical model
In this section, we incorporate observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity to the
stylized theoretical model presented in the previous section and provide speciﬁc functional
assumptions for g(.), c(.),a n dF.
We deﬁne di as the distance between beneﬁciary i’s place of residence and the closest
oﬃce where she may receive the payment. It is assumed that this distance does not change
across time.25 In addition, let Xi and ui be a vector of observed and unobserved (from
the econometrician’s point of view) individual’s characteristics, respectively. The observed
characteristics include household demographic variables used in the reduced form models.
The unobserved individual characterstics capture other features of households that are not
available in the data and that may explain their behavior. Examples of such unobserved
characteristics include the family’s health status and measurement error in the home-to-
agency travel time.26
24We solve the models recursively. That is, given certain functional form assumptions about g(.), c(.),a n d
F, and a set of parameter values, we compute recursively the values of WT(a),W T−1(a),W T−2(a),...until
convergence is achieved for all values of a.O n c ew eh a v ee v a l u a t e d{W∗(a)}
¯ a
a=1we may simulate individual’s
decisions by obtaining realizations from εt and applying the optimal rules P∗
t (a).
25That is, we assume that neither individuals nor authorized ﬁnancial institutions move during the time
span of our sample (one year).
26In the previous section we found that measurement error was not an important source of bias in reduced
form models.
16We assume a linear speciﬁcation for both g(.) and c(.).T h a ti s ,
g[aM − c]=aM − c,
and
c(di,X i,u i)=c0 + c1di + Xiγ + ui, (4)
where γ is a vector of parameters.
Finally, we let both εi and ui be i.i.d. and normally distributed with mean zero and
variance σ2
u and σ2
ε, respectively. Notice that, given {di,X i,u i} and a set of parameter values
θ = {β,c0,c 1,γ,σ2
ε}, we may solve the model and predict the behavior of each individual.
4.3 Estimation
To estimate our model, we use our database and Simulated Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(SMLE) methods. In this section, we specify the relevant likelihood function.
Let Pit equal one if the individual i redeems her payment in period t and zero otherwise.
In addition, let ait be the number of $M payments that the beneﬁciary i may redeem at
period t. Notice that, for each individual i =1 ,...N in our sample, we observe the variables
{Pit,a it,d i,X i}
T
t=1.
Given θ and a particular realization of ui, the likelihood of observing an individual i
receiving a transfer of aitM monetary units in period t is equivalent to the probability that
the right hand side of Equation (2) is no less that its left hand side. That is,
Pr{Pit =1 |ait,X i,u i;θ} =P r {aitM − c(di,X i,u i)+εt + βW
∗
i (1) >β W
∗
i (ait +1 ) }
=1 − Φ{βW
∗
i (ait +1 )− aitM + c(di,X i,u i) − βW
∗
i (1)},
17where Φ is a normal cumulative distribution function with mean zero and variance σ2
ε,a n d
ait < ¯ a.W h e nait =¯ a, this probability becomes
Pr{Pit =1 |ait,X i,u i;θ} =1− Φ{βW
∗
i (ait) − aitM + c(di,X i,u i) − βW
∗
i (1)}.
With these deﬁnitions, we may compute the conditional likelihood of observing an indi-
vidual redeeming her payments as
L
1
it|ait,X i,u i;θ = Π
¯ a
j=1 (Pr{Pit =1 |ait,X i,u i;θ})
aitj ,
where aitj equals one if ait = j and zero otherwise (j =1 ,..,¯ a). On the other hand, the
probability that this individual does not redeem her payment is
L
0
it|ait,X i,u i;θ =1− L
1
it|ait,X i,u i;θ.
Thus, the conditional likelihood contribution of observing the behavior of an individual i





















where G is a normal cumulative distribution function with mean zero and variance σ2
u.
The integral of the right hand side of Equation (5) will be evaluated using simulation
methods. The SMLE parameter estimates are the ones that maximize the log-likelihood of
observing this sample.
185R e s u l t s
5.1 Estimates and within-sample ﬁt
Because our model’s cost function is linear, we are not able to separately identify the mean
transportation cost from the mean discount factor. Thus, a normalization is needed. We
choose to pick a particular value for the monthly discount factor of low-income mothers and
estimate the rest of the parameters of the model. Because these low-income families face
important credit constraints, we have assumed a monthly discount rate of 0.98.27
In Table 5, we present the SMLE estimates of our structural model. Unlike the parame-
ters of most reduced form models, our estimates have a direct economic interpretation and
illustrate how the mothers’ home-to-agency transportation costs vary with respect to their
own characteristics. For example, the estimated coeﬃcient on distance (0.013) suggests that
the opportunity cost of the home-to-agency travel time is close to $0.40 per hour (a little less
than one cent per minute).28 This is a reasonable estimate considering that the Ecuadorian
minimum wage in 2004 was close to $1 per hour.
[Please, insert Table 5]
In addition, our results provide evidence that travel costs decrease with age and are
somewhat smaller for women who have a partner. Moreover, the coeﬃcients corresponding
to the number of rooms and the tenure of a housing unit are both positive and statistically
27In 2004, nominal interest rates (including other fees) of consumption credits in Ecuadorian ﬁnancial
institutions averaged 18%. However, most of the low-income households in our sample may not qualify to
obtain a loan in the formal ﬁnancial sector. In the informal sector, they may obtain short term loans that
(illegally) charge an average interest rate of 5% per month. For this reason, we think that the corresponding
discount factor for this set of households should be relatively low (0.98). The main results of the paper do
not change for alternative discount factor assumptions.
28Notice that the distance variable measures one-way travel time from the individual’s residence to the
payment agency. Thus, our results suggest that travel time is worth $0.013 for every two minutes, or $0.39
per hour.
19signiﬁcant, meaning that the opportunity cost of traveling increases with wealth. Finally,
the coeﬃcient on the Selben index is negative suggesting that travel costs decrease with
higher values of this index. This may seem counterintuitive at ﬁrst since this index is, by
construction, positively associated with income and wealth. However, once we control for
the household’s housing characteristics, home-to-agency distance, and the other demographic
variables included in our speciﬁcation, there may be other factors that are captured by the
Selben index that are negatively related to travel costs. For example, families with a high
index value in our sample may be more likely to own a vehicle or to know someone who owns
one, and this will certainly decrease their cost of traveling.
To examine the within-sample ﬁt, we use the estimated model to simulate the behavior
of the households in our sample and compare it with the observed data. For instance, in
the ﬁrst column of Table 6, we compute the predicted share of individuals that receive the
subsidy and, in the second column, the actual share observed in our sample. We compute
both unconditional and conditional shares. The unconditional share corresponds to the
percentage of beneﬁciaries who decide to cash their beneﬁti na n yg i v e nm o n t h . O nt h e
other hand, to estimate the conditional shares, we restrict the sample to those individuals
who have received their last payment one, two, three, or four months ago.
[Please, insert Table 6]
Overall, the model ﬁts the observed conditional and unconditional shares of individuals
who receive the subsidy very well. For example, there are virtually no diﬀerences between
the unconditional predicted and actual share of low-income mothers who receive the transfer.
This is also true for most conditional shares. The only relevant diﬀerence is related to those
households who have accrued three months of payments. In our sample, 85% of those families
20decided to receive the payment in the current month, and our model overpredicts this number
by about six percentage points.
In our view, the within-sample ﬁt described above gives us enough conﬁdence in the
model to use it to perform counterfactual experiments to explore the beneﬁts and costs of
alternative payment mechanisms.
5.2 Policy experiments
One of the primary beneﬁts of estimating a structural model is that it can be used to
conduct counterfactual experiments. In this section, we use our estimated model to estimate
the economic value of the program and, also, to evaluate alternative payment options.
According to our model, the average economic value of the subsidy is close to $842 among
rural households.29 Thus, the overall value of the BDH program in Ecuador may be at least
$800 million.30
The value of the program, of course, increases with the number of payments that house-
holds are allowed to accrue. For instance, the current program, that allows households to
accrue up to four months of payments, is about $5 million more valuable than an identical
program with no payment accrual. Increasing the number of periods that households are
allowed to accumulate their payments to ﬁve or six months, however, does not change the
value of the program signiﬁcantly. This occurs because only a few households with high
travel costs are aﬀected by such policy.
We compute another counterfactual that allows us to quantify the household’s welfare
29According to our model, the average economic value of the program can be computed as ¯ W∗(1).T h i s
corresponds to the minimum cash amount that recipients would be willing to accept to give up the program.
30Because urban households are on average closer to payment agencies than their rural counterparts, we
expect that the economic value of the subsidy is higher among these households. Since there are a little
more than 1 million of recipients, the overall value of the program should be at least $800 million.
21gains if the government raises the number of payment agencies in rural locations. In partic-
ular, we assume that new payment agencies are built such that the home-to-agency travel
time of a representative rural household decreases by 60 minutes. In Table 7, we show that
such policy increases the value of being enrrolled in the program by about 4%. To assess the
eﬃciency of such policy, the Ecuadorian authorities should evaluate both the magnitude of
the total beneﬁts (4% increase per household) and the total costs (operating costs of such
agencies) involved in such operation.
[Please, insert Table 7]
Finally, the model may also be used to create a diﬀerentiated schedule of payments that
compensates rural households for their travel time-opportunity costs. That is, the payments
could be geographically diﬀerentiated so that the total value of the program is the same for
every household.31 We present estimates of this counterfactual experiment in Table 8. This
results suggest that rural households located in the Amazon and in the Highlands should
receive between $0.25 and $0.50 higher monthly transfers than their urban counterparts to
compensate them for their travel costs.
[Please, insert Table 8]
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have speciﬁed and estimated a simple behavioral model that resembles the
household’s collection decisions of a CCT program in Ecuador. Despite its simplicity, the
31To construct this experiment, we ﬁrst compute the value of the BDH program for a representative family
that has the option to receive $15 per month. The representative family has the mean characteristics of our
sample of rural households, except for the home-to-agency travel time. This variable has been set to zero,
since we are interested in computing the value of the program for a family that lives in an area with a
payment agency. Then, we ﬁnd the transfer that the average household in each Province should receive to
match the value of the program of the former representative family.
22model replicates the observed data well and may be a powerful tool for designing the delivery
of payments of such a program. In addition, the counterfactual experiments suggest that
an adequate design of the delivery of payments can substantially increase the value of CCT
programs.
In our model, transportation costs are the main source of households’ transaction costs.
We recognize that there may be other sources of transaction costs that inﬂuence the collec-
tion’s decisions of households. For example, the opportunity cost from waiting in line at the
payment agencies and other illegal fees that may be charged at the time of collecting the
transfer may also aﬀe c tt h ev a l u eo ft h ep r o g r a m .W ee m p h a s i z et h a t ,w i t ht h ea p p r o p r i a t e
data, the model speciﬁed in this paper may be a useful benchmark to analyze household’s
behavior under these circumstances as well.
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Share of Parroquias 
(a smaller geographic 
region) with a 
payment agency 
b
Share of beneficiaries 
that reside in a 
Parroquia  with a 
payment agency
Azuay 47,486 15 0.04 0.28
Bolivar 25,418 2 0.06 0.31
Cañar 18,381 8 0.06 0.28
Carchi 13,589 5 0.11 0.42
Chimborazo 48,758 4 0.06 0.31
Cotopaxi 38,261 7 0.09 0.30
El Oro 49,221 20 0.14 0.73
Esmeraldas 38,967 7 0.06 0.48
Francisco De Orellana 8,875 2 0.06 0.42
Galapagos 340 2 0.25 0.71
Guayas 271,156 46 0.39 0.75
Imbabura 36,476 8 0.08 0.47
Loja 46,428 9 0.08 0.37
Los Rios 66,533 20 0.17 0.64
Manabi 148,581 19 0.12 0.52
Morona Santiago 9,500 2 0.03 0.20
Napo 7,922 2 0.05 0.38
Pastaza 5,011 5 0.05 0.41
Pichincha 123,500 55 0.41 0.79
Sucumbios 13,244 4 0.03 0.33
Tungurahua 41,601 9 0.08 0.36
Zamora Chinchipe 9,222 2 0.06 0.03
Other   1,571 3 0.25 0.51
Total 1,070,041 256 0.13 0.56
Notes:
The information displayed on this table was tabulated using the universe of the payment data collected by BANRED.
We thank Miguel Acosta from the Banco Central del Ecuador for sharing this information with us.
a We have included agencies with at least 20 transactions per month.
b According to the Ecuadorian 2000 Census, there are 1149 Parroquias  in Ecuador.
Table 1: Geographical distribution of beneficiaries and payment agencies of the Bono de 
Desarrollo Humano in 2004
Agencies from BanredTable 2: Descriptive Statistics
Number of observations: 2523
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Number of payments : Number of times that the 
subsidy was collected from January to December 
2004
11.04 1.53 4 12
Distance : Travel time (minutes) from center of the 
Parroquia where beneficiaries reside to the closest 
point where they can collect the transfer
15.20 19.95 0 118.18
Urban: Takes the value of one if beneficiary 
resides in an Urban Area (as defined by the 
Ecuadorian 2000 Census)
0.62 0.49 0 1
No education : One if beneficiary has not received 
any type of formal education
0.09 0.29 0 1
Age: Age (in years) of beneficiary 32.36 8.13 14 61
Family partner : Equals to one if beneficiary has a 
partner living at home
0.75 0.44 0 1
Children : Number of living children 3.51 2.16 0 13
Rooms : Number of rooms in housing unit 1.05 0.86 0 5
Tenure: Equals to one if individual owns the 
housing unit where she resides
0.18 0.38 0 1
Selben index : Selben proxy-means index 40.62 6.36 12.88 50.64Table 3: Linear Regressions
Dependent variable: Number of times that the subsidy was collected in 2004
Number of observations: 2,523
White - Robust Standard errors in parenthesis
Constant x 11.079 *** 11.353 *** 10.494 *** 11.282 ***
(0.073)   (0.424)   (0.493)   (0.510)  
Distance -0.021 *** -0.020 *** -0.019 *** -0.019 ***
(0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)   (0.003)  
Urban x 0.245 *** 0.241 *** 0.031 -0.024
(0.084)   (0.085)   (0.088)   (0.091)  
Urban x Distance  0.017 *** 0.017 *** 0.017 *** 0.017 ***
(0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004)   (0.004)  
Age x -0.023 -0.014 -0.030
  (0.026)   (0.026)   (0.026)  
Age
2 0.001 0.000 0.001
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
No education x -0.137 0.000 0.030
  (0.113)   (0.118)   (0.121)  
Has a partner x 0.078 0.121 * 0.108 *
  (0.067)   (0.067)   (0.065)  
Number of children -0.041 ** 0.007 0.009
  (0.019)   (0.021)   (0.021)  
Number of rooms in housing unit x  -0.173 *** -0.095 **
      (0.038)   (0.040)  
Housing unit tenure (One if owns)   -0.459 *** -0.297 ***
      (0.101)   (0.112)  
Selben index   0.022 *** 0.014 **
       (0.006)   (0.006)  
Region Fixed Effects (21) No No No Yes
R-squared 0.085 0.089 0.113 0.170
Note: Coefficients of the dummy variables for areas are not reported 
*   : Statistically significant at the 10% level
**  : Statistically significant at the 5% level
*** : Statistically significant at the 1% level
 (4) 
Independent Variables
 (1)   (2)   (3) 
ModelTable 4: Probit Regressions
Dependent variable equals to one if subsidy is collected in any period (month) 
Number of observations: 30,276
White - Robust Standard errors in parenthesis
Constant x 1.394 *** 1.739 *** 1.516 *** 1.712 ***
(0.021)   (0.045)   (0.204)   (0.365)  
Distance -0.008 *** -0.009 *** -0.007 *** -0.008 ***
(0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)  
Urban x 0.191 *** 0.238 *** 0.042 0.046
(0.029)   (0.055)   (0.032)   (0.058)  
Urban x Distance  0.005 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.007 ***
(0.001)   (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.002)  
Age x -0.015 -0.008
   (0.011)   (0.019)  
Age
2 0.0003 * 0.0002
   (0.000)   (0.000)  
No education x 0.002 -0.040
   (0.041)   (0.073)  
Has a partner x 0.070 *** 0.097 **
   (0.026)   (0.047)  
Number of children 0.004 0.004
   (0.008)   (0.013)  
Number of rooms in housing unit x -0.058 *** -0.083 ***
   (0.014)   (0.026)  
Tenure -0.136 *** -0.170 ***
   (0.033)   (0.061)  
Selben index 0.007 *** 0.008 **
     (0.002)   (0.004)  
Region Fixed Effects (21) No No Yes Yes
Note: Coefficients of the dummy variables for areas are not reported.
Columns (2) and (4) control for individual random effects.
*   : Statistically significant at the 10% level
**  : Statistically significant at the 5% level
*** : Statistically significant at the 1% level
 (3)   (4) 
Independent Variables
 (1)   (2) 
ModelTable 5: Structural Estimates
Coefficient
Constant x -0.823 (0.262) ***
 
Distance 0.013 (0.002) ***
 





No education x -0.127 (0.059) **
 
Has a partner x -0.070 (0.046)
 
Number of children -0.014 (0.010)
 
Number of rooms in housing unit x 0.115 (0.029) ***
 
Tenure 0.377 (0.080) ***
 
Selben index -0.026 (0.006) ***
  




The discount factor β has been normalized to 0.98. 
The data consists of a panel of 970 rural households over 12 months. 
The corresponding sample size is 11,040.
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 *   : Statistically significant at the 10% level
**  : Statistically significant at the 5% level
*** : Statistically significant at the 1% level
Std. Dev. Independent VariablesTable 6: Percentage of beneficiaries that collect the transfer 
              in any given month
*
Model Sample
Overall (unconditional) 88.7% 88.7%





* The unconditional  share corresponds to the percentage of beneficiaries who decide to cash their 
benefit in any given month. To estimate the conditional  shares, we restrict the sample to those 
individuals who have received their last payment one, two, three, or four months ago.Table 7: Economic value of the subsidy if home-to-agency 
travel time decreases by 60 minutes*
Travel time to closest 
town with payment 
agency (in minutes)
Economic value of 




in program's value 





* These are estimates for a representative rural household. The observed characteristics correspond













Esmeraldas 15.05 Bolivar 15.57 Napo 15.44
Guayas 15.06 Cañar 15.38 Pastaza 15.65














Table 8: Differentiated transfers in rural areas to compensate 
households for their travel costs 
*
* To construct this experiment, we first compute the value of the BDH program for a representative family that has the 
option to receive $15 per month. The representative family has the mean characteristics of our sample of rural households, 
except for the home-to-agency travel time. This variable has been set to zero, since we are interested in computing the 
value of the program for a family that lives in an area with a payment agency. Then, we find the transfer that the average 
household in each Province should receive to match the value of the program of the former representative family.
Highlands (Sierra) East (Oriente) West (Costa)